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This paper analyses the disposition effect at an individual level by studying the trading records of 20 379 investors over 
1999-2006. As in previous studies, we confirm a huge heterogeneity among investors and we propose to explain these 
differences on the basis of financial sophistication and trading behavior proxies. Originally, we use direct sophistication 
variables: trading of foreign assets, derivative assets and bonds and trading on both tax-free and traditional accounts.  We 
show that these variables reduce significantly the level of the disposition effect. Furthermore, based on a dynamic panel data 
analysis, we question the ability of investors to correct their bias over time. Results show that individual investor’s 
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I.  Introduction   
Standard finance models assume that investors act with extreme rationality. In contrast, a 
number of recent studies demonstrate that investment behavior often departs from what 
rational theory predicts. For instance, individual portfolios are under-diversified (Goetzmann 
and Kumar, 2007), investors are overconfident (Barber and Odean, 2001) and net buyers of 
attention-grabbing stocks (Barber and Odean, 2008). These inconsistencies often lead to 
subsequent poor portfolio performance.  
Starting with Shefrin and Statman (1985), a number of researchers have documented the 
presence of the disposition effect. This bias describes the tendency of investors to more 
readily sell winners than losers (winners and losers referring to assets that have appreciated or 
depreciated since purchase). The existence of the disposition effect for a representative 
investor (or a group of investors) is documented by Odean (1998) in the US,  Shapira and 
Venezia (2001) in Israel, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) in Finland and Barber et al. (2007) 
in Taiwan
3. 
Based on a different approach, Feng and Seasholes (2005) and Dhar and Zhu (2006) conduct 
an analysis of the disposition effect at an individual level. Dhar and Zhu (2006) show that 
even if on average, they observe a positive disposition effect, there is considerable 
heterogeneity among their sample investors. For instance, they demonstrate that about 20% of 
the investors they study exhibit the opposite behavior; they are more prone to sell their losing 
stocks. Individual differences in the disposition effect are significantly attributed to financial 
sophistication. Dhar and Zhu (2006) relate financial sophistication to professional occupation 
and income. Feng and Seasholes (2005) posit that initial portfolio diversification and number 
                                                            
3 For other countries see, for instance, Brown et al. (2006) for Australia or Chen et al., (2007) for China. Coval 
and Shumway (2005), Frino et al. (2005) and Locke and Mann (2005) obtain the same kind of results on 
professional futures markets. Weber and Camerer (1998) bring experimental evidence of this bias. 
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of trading rights are sophistication proxies and obtain similar results. Note that these authors 
further demonstrate that a combination of financial sophistication and trading experience can 
help investors to correct their behavioral mistakes.  
Our work offers three main contributions. First, by analyzing 5.8 million trades, this work is 
the most comprehensive study of the individual level of the disposition effect in a European 
context.  
Second, we analyze the impact of direct and never used measures of financial sophistication 
on the disposition effect. Actually, it is worth noting that direct measures of sophistication are 
very rarely used in the literature; Feng and Seasholes (2005) prove to be an exception. We 
consider investors to be sophisticated if they trade foreign assets, derivative assets, bonds and 
if they hold multiple accounts to place orders. We hypothesize that investors trading foreign 
assets and bonds are sophisticated because they are more likely to be conscious of 
diversification benefits. Furthermore, trading derivative assets requires familiarity with 
option-like payoffs, which may hint to enhanced financial sophistication. Finally, investors in 
our dataset have the opportunity to trade on traditional accounts and on tax-free accounts 
(French “PEA”).  On these last accounts, capital gains are completely tax-free under some 
conditions; for instance, to benefit from tax exoneration, investors must hold the account for 
more than 5 years. In this respect, we consider investors trading the two types of accounts to 
be sophisticated because they take advantage of the traditional account flexibility and of the 
tax exoneration.  
The third contribution of our paper is to give a comprehensive analysis of the dynamics of the 
disposition bias over time. We answer two main questions: Are investors able to correct their 
disposition bias over time? Does financial sophistication play a role in this correction?  4 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and the preliminary 
results. Sections III and IV present our empirical results based on a cross sectional analysis 
and on the dynamics of the disposition effect. Section V brings concluding remarks.  
II. Data and Preliminary Results 
The data used in our research is provided by a large French discount brokerage house and 
cover the period 1999-2006. First of all, note that measuring the disposition effect is not 
possible for investors holding portfolios with only purchases, portfolios with only one trade 
and portfolios containing sales for which no previous purchase could be identified (see below 
for a precise description of the methodology). According with this constraint, our initial 
database transactions were operated by 57 153 individual investors.   
There are three data files: a trade file, an investors file and a fees file. The trade file contains 
information on the stocks each individual buys or sells, the price at which stocks are bought 
and sold, the time of such trades and the type of account used to place the orders (taxable 
versus tax-free accounts – French “PEA”). The investors file gathers some demographical 
information such as date of birth, sex and place of living. Finally, the fees file contains 
monthly fees paid by each investor.  
It is well documented that on the average individual investors exhibit a low trading 
activity (Odean, 1998, Barber and Odean, 2001, Dhar and Zhu, 2006). In order to stress the 
learning of investors over time, we intentionally discard “less active traders”. To do this, we 
select investors for whom we can compute the disposition effect for at least 4 years 
(consecutive or not) over our dataset period. Therefore, the analysis of the disposition effect at 
an individual level is conducted on 5.8 millions transactions operated by 20 379 investors. 
We present descriptive statistics of our data in Table 1. As expected, our selection 
criteria lead to differences regarding trading behavior between the two samples. In table 1, the 5 
 
second column gathers descriptive statistics of the initial dataset while the third column 
presents statistics of the final sample. 
                                          [Table 1 about here] 
 
Concerning trading behavior, on average, investors in our final sample have more 
trades (mean = 284 and median = 137) than the initial sample (mean = 144 and median = 52). 
On the whole period investors in our sample also trade higher amounts (mean = 1 037 870 
EUR and median = 299 328 EUR) than those of the initial data base (mean = 558 429 EUR 
and median = 109 157 EUR). In the same vein and obviously, trading activity, where activity 
measures the number of year during which investors trade over our dataset period is higher in 
our sample (mean = 6.82 years and median = 7 years compared to mean = 4.98 years and 
median = 5 years in the entire data). Finally, demographic statistics show that in both datasets, 
the average investor is around 43 years old and that most traders are men. 
  The disposition effect at an individual level is computed following Odean (1998). The 
author defines the disposition effect as the difference between investors’ propensity to realize 
winning stocks and losing stocks in their portfolios. By assuming that individual trades are 
independent, Odean (1998) shows the presence of the disposition effect at an aggregate level 
(representative investor). In this paper, we focus on individual disposition effect. We thus 
measure the disposition effect for each individual, which allows us to examine possible cross-
sectional variation in the effect among investors with different characteristics. 
  Each day an investor sells securities, we determine whether the security is sold for a 
gain or for a loss by comparing its selling price to its average purchase price. Hence, each sale 
is counted as a Realized Gain (RG ) or a Realized Loss (RL). Each stock in the portfolio at 
the beginning of the day that is not sold during that day is considered to be an unrealized gain, 6 
 
Paper Gain (PG ) or an unrealized loss, Paper Loss (PL). Paper Gains and Paper Losses are 
defined by comparing the high and low price of the stock on that day to its average purchase 
price. If both the high and low price are above the average purchase price, we count a Paper 
Gain (PG ). Otherwise, we count a Paper Loss (PL). If the average purchase price lies 
between the low price and the high price, neither a Paper Gain nor a Paper Loss is counted.  
All gains and losses are calculated after adjusting for splits.  
The key values (RG ,RL,PG  and PL) allow to compute the Proportion of Realized 
Gains ( i PGR ), the Proportion of Realized Losses ( i PLR ) and the Disposition Effect ( i DE ) for 
each individual investor i according to the following rules : 
(1)
        

















ii RG PG NNand ( )
ii RL PL NN  denote the Number of Realized (Paper) Gains and the 
Number of Realized (Paper) Losses of investor i. The disposition effect for individual i is 
defined as the difference between the Proportion of Realized Gains ( i PGR ) and the 
Proportion of Realized Losses ( i PLR ). When this difference is positive, it implies that 
investor i is more prone to realize his gains than his losses. It is important to point out that the 
computation of the disposition effect at an individual level implies that the PGR  and 
PLRmeasured for a particular investor are independent from the PGR  and PLR observed on 
all other accounts. We thus assume that individual accounts are independent
4.   
                                                            
4 For a discussion on the limits of these measures, see for example Feng and Seasholes (2005). 7 
 
Our first issue pertains to the computation of the disposition effect for each of the 20 379 
individual investors of our sample. We measurePGR ,  PLR and DE for each investor and 
report average values of the different estimates. Table 2 presents the results.  
                                          [Table 2 about here] 
 







Where  PGR  and PLR are the average values of PGR  and PLR  across our sample investors 
over the period 1999-2006.  DE S is the empirical standard deviation of the individual 
disposition effect and n is the number of investors. Results show that on our sample, the null 
hypothesis (PGR PLR ≤ ) is rejected with a high degree of statistical significance. The 
average value of  DE  is positive (0.099) and   / PGR PLR  equals 2.012.  The ratio PGR  to 
PLR is the rate at which the individual investors prefer to sell winning stocks rather than 
losing ones. On average, a stock that is up in value is more than 100% (2.012) more likely to 
be sold that a stock that is down.  
We also present in Figure 1 the distribution of DE  across our sample investors. We 
notice that even if we observe an average positiveDE , there is a non-negligible heterogeneity 
among our investors. An interesting finding is that all investors do not exhibit the disposition 
bias (we call them “Non-positive DE  investors”). More precisely, 13.7%
5 (2 781 investors) 
of the investors do not exhibit any disposition effect ( 0 DE = ) or exhibit an opposite behavior 
( 0 DE < ). On the  sub-sample of “Non-positive DE  investors”, PGR  is 0.13,PLR is 0.18 
                                                            
5 0.10% of our sample investors do not exhibit any disposition bias and 13.6% of them have an opposite 
behavior.   8 
 
and  DE  is – 0.05 (Z stat −  = - 46.094). All these results are consistent with previous 
research, for instance, Dhar and Zhu (2006) obtain an average DE  of 0.21, a ratio PGR  to 
PLR equal to 2.23 and about 20% of the investors exhibit a negative DE. 
                                          [Figure 1 about here] 
 
In the following section we test our main assumptions on the determinants and the evolution 
of the DE at the individual level. First, we analyze if the disposition effect is lower for 
sophisticated investors (Section III). Second, we test if the disposition effect decreases over 
time and depends on the level of investor’s sophistication (Section IV). 
III.   Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Disposition Effect 
The obvious question which arises is to explain the observed heterogeneity among investors. 
Previous research (Feng and Seasholes, 2005, Dhar and Zhu, 2006 and Chen et al., 2007) 
suggests that demographic variables, financial sophistication or trade experience can 
contribute to the fact that individual disposition effect varies across investors. Financial 
sophistication relates to accrued familiarity with financial markets and sophisticated investors 
are endowed with financial skills which may help them resist to the disposition effect. 
Typically, in the literature, the proxies used to financial sophistication are indirect measures 
and include professional occupation, income (Dhar and Zhu, 2006, Chen et al., 2007) and 
living location (big cosmopolitan cities or not) (Chen et al., 2007). Direct measures of 
sophistication are rarely used; Feng and Seasholes (2005) prove to be an exception. The 
authors use initial portfolio diversification (number of stocks) and number of trading rights
6  
as sophistication proxies. 
                                                            
6 The authors study investors in the PRC. Traders in the PRC cannot use different ways to place orders 
(computer terminals in branch office, internet, telephone, etc) if they are not granted the authorization to. They 
have to apply for the “right” to use each method. Hence, the authors hypothesize that sophisticated traders are 9 
 
In the same lines, we propose that differences in individual disposition effect can be 
explained by investors’ intrinsic characteristics described in Table 3.  The chosen variables 
can be classified into three categories: demographics, trading behavior and financial 
sophistication. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Demographic variables include Age and Gender.  Gender differences in investment behavior 
are now well-documented. For instance, Barber and Odean (2001) show that men are more 
overconfident than women, which leads them to trade 45% more than women. This behavior 
clearly hurts their portfolio performance, driving up their trading costs and reducing their net 
returns by 2.65 percentage points a year, compared to 1.72 percentage points for women. 
Gender differences may thus affect individual investment decisions. As shown in table 3, 
nearly 83% of our sample traders are men. Previous research also demonstrates the impact of 
age on investment choices (Goyal, 2004, Ang and Maddaloni, 2005). We thus expect traders 
in different age groups to vary in the disposition bias. 
The trading behavior category includes Trade Size and Delay. Trade Size for a given 
investor is computed as the total amount traded (EUR) over 1999-2006 divided by the total 
number of trades he/she realizes over the same period. Trade Size is usually taken as a proxy 
to investors’ wealth when this information is not available (Chen et al., 2007). The common 
assumption is that investors trading high amounts can afford value-added services such as 
financial advices. Thereby, these investors have better financial literacy and are sophisticated 
agents. In the same vein, we suppose that Trade size can contribute to explain individual 
differences in the disposition bias. However, Trade Size being an indirect measure of wealth 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
more likely to have a higher number of trading rights to place orders. Hence, the authors hypothesize that traders 
who apply and obtain the right to use a higher number of trading rights to place orders are sophisticated. 
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and accordingly an imperfect proxy to sophistication, we choose not to classify this variable 
in the financial sophistication category. Finally, Delay  captures two aspects of trading 
behavior: the total number of trades realized and the trade rhythm. Delay
7 for a given investor 
is defined as the average interval between two consecutive sales. Actually, we assume that a 
low delay may hint first to enhanced familiarity with financial markets and thus a lower 
disposition bias. Secondly, a low delay may hint to a higher frequency of adjustment of the 
reference point. Following Weber and Camerer (1998), the closer the reference point to the 
current price, the lower the disposition effect. Refering to Table 3, the average trade size on 
our sample is nearly equal to 3030 EUR and the average delay is nearly 3 months (86 days). 
Differing from previous research, we are particularly concerned about finding direct 
measures of sophistication. We therefore choose the following variables: Foreign Trade, 
Bonds, Warrants and Two Accounts.  Foreign Trade and Bonds pertain to portfolio 
diversification issues. We hypothesize that investors who trade foreign assets or bonds are 
sophisticated traders because they are better aware of diversification benefits. Furthermore, 
compared to “traditional” instruments, trading warrants is more complex or difficult to 
individual investors
8. Indeed, trading warrants requires familiarity with option-like payoffs; 
investors trading warrants are thus likely to be sophisticated. Finally, the existence of tax-free 
accounts in the French system allows us to build a last original sophistication proxy. Actually, 
on the French market, investors can hold two types of accounts to manage their portofolio: 
traditional accounts and/or tax-free accounts named “PEA” (Plan d’Epargne en Actions). 
Capital gains are completely tax-free on PEA accounts. However, to compensate this 
advantage, PEA accounts have to be kept for more than 5 years and the investment universe is 
reduced. We thus assume that any investor holding both a PEA account and a traditional 
                                                            
7 Delay is by construction negatively linked to the number of trades. 
8 A survey carried out by NYSE-Euronext in 2007 highlights that approximately 70% of investors think that 
trading warrants requires good financial training. 11 
 
account is sophisticated because he takes advantage of the flexibility offered by the traditional 
accounts and simultaneously of the tax exoneration attached to PEA accounts. Column 3 of 
Table 3 shows that on our sub-sample of 20 379 traders, 86% of the investors trade foreign 
assets, 12% trade bonds, 24% trade warrants and 61% hold both a PEA and a traditional 
account to place orders.  
A preliminary way to test the hypothesis that our variables can contribute to explain 
the observed heterogeneity in the individual disposition effect is to compare the magnitude of 
the bias across investors’ characteristics. Focusing mainly on our financial sophistication 
proxies, we classify investors following whether they are sophisticated investors 
(sophistication =1) or unsophisticated investors (sophistication=0) and report in Table 4 the 




Results in Table 4 show that men, women and the 4 groups of sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors are prone to the disposition bias. However, the magnitude of the 
bias seems to be lower for men and for financially sophisticated traders. For instance, the 
average individual disposition effect for investors trading foreign assets is 0.093 compared to 
0.102 for investors trading only local assets. Though more investigation is clearly needed, this 
first result shows that sophistication appears to attenuate the magnitude of the disposition 
effect. 
  To better understand the impact of our variables on the bias, we model the following 
linear relationship: 12 
 
12 3 4 5
67 8
ln  
 ln   ln (2)
ii i i i i
ii i i
DE a b Age b Gender b Foreign trade b Bonds b Warrants
b Two Accounts b Trade size b Delay e
=+ + + + + +
++ +
The dependent variable is the individual disposition effect computed for each individual 
investor according to equation (1). Explanatory variables include demographic variables, 
financial sophistication proxies and variables related to trading behavior. A log transformation 
of some of the variables is needed because those exhibit an asymmetric distribution. Column 
2 of Table 5 reports the regression results (Model 1). We also present in columns 3 to 6 
(Models 2 to 5) regression results for each sophistication variable separately. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Focusing on the base model (Column 2), all of our variables have a significant impact on the 
individual disposition effect. The coefficients of the demographic variables and of the 
financial sophistication proxies are negative. Thereby, male investors trading foreign assets, 
bonds and warrants and placing orders on both their PEA and traditional accounts are less 
prone to the disposition effect. This supports our hypothesis that accrued familiarity with 
financial markets and financial skills help investors reduce their disposition bias. On the 
opposite, trading behavior variables impact positively the disposition effect. Consistent with 
our assumption, the lower the delay between successive sales, the lower the magnitude of the 
bias. In fact, it is expected that investors who trade frequently and regularly become more 
familiar with financial markets and adjust smoothly their reference point towards the current 
price, thereby reducing their disposition effect. The positive impact of Trade Size on the bias 
is surprising and not consistent with previous research. For instance, Chen et al. (2007) 
observe that the average amount traded by investors impacts negatively the bias. It is however 
noteworthy to point out that Chen et al. (2007) focus on the Chinese market where it is 13 
 
mandatory that investors hold at most one account. On the French market, investors have the 
opportunity to trade with multiple accounts, tax incentives often urging them to do so. Note 
that the results obtained on the base model (Model 1) are globally confirmed on the other 
models (models 2 to 5).  
 
IV. Panel Data Analysis of the Disposition Effect 
    
In the previous section, we have been dealing with the disposition effect at a static 
level and have ignored the fact that there may exist time patterns of the bias. In the next 
section, we extend our analysis of the disposition effect by integrating temporal characteristics 
in our study. The first sub-section mainly answers the following question: do the results 
obtained at a static level hold when we integrate temporal aspects in our analysis?  
In the second sub-section, we investigate whether investors can correct their bias over 
time. 
  
IV.1. Time-series Analyses of the Disposition Effect 
 
We study the temporal characteristics of our 20 379 investors’ trading behavior by focusing 
on a yearly length period. The average delay between consecutive sales over our sub-sample 
being approximately equal to 3 months (see Table 3), a lower time interval (for instance, 
monthly computation of the disposition effect) would have led to sharply reduce the number 
of investors and the heterogeneity between investors. The computation of yearly disposition 
effects for our 20 379 sample investors allows us to calculate a total of 114 747 DEs. We are 
able to compute a DE  on each of the 8 years of our sample period for 14.97% of the investors 
(3 050 investors). Note that due to our data selection criteria (see section II) – only investors 14 
 
for whom we can compute a DE  for at least 4 years (consecutive or not), our panel is 
unbalanced.  
In a first step, we aim at describing the 114 747 yearly DEs. Figure 2 plots the density 
function of the disposition effect for our sample investors.  The disposition effect is widely 
distributed between -1 and 1. An interesting finding is that the study of the bias over time puts 
to light the same kind of heterogeneity than the one observed in the analysis of the disposition 
effect across investors (section II). The extent of the bias varies greatly over time; standard 
deviation (0.236) is almost twice the mean (0.122). Furthermore, the median (0.091) is 
smaller than the mean, reflecting the asymmetric shape of the distribution. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
To better understand how the bias varies over time, we build a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if the yearly DE  is strictly positive and 0 otherwise. This classification shows 
that nearly 80% of our observations with a strictly positive DE  for one year remain with a 
strictly positive DE  over the following year
9.  
  In a second step, we check whether the variables we found to have a significant impact 
on the disposition effect at the static level (demographics, financial sophistication and trading 
behavior proxies) still play the same role when DE  is computed on a yearly basis. In this 
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9 In the same lines, 44% of observations with a  0 DE ≤  follow the same trend over the next year. 
10 Note that the results of all the following sections are not modified if we focus the analyse on the sub-group of 
17 006 traders who exhibit a positive first DE . 15 
 
The dependent variable is the yearly disposition effect,  i α  are individual-specific effects and 
it ε the idiosyncratic error. Periodic values are computed for Trade Size and Delay. Trade Size 
(resp. Delay) for investor i in a specific year equals the total amount he/she traded (total delay 
between successive sales) during the year divided by the total number of trades (total number 
of sales minus one) realized in the same year. The average trade size over years is 2 827 EUR 
(standard deviation = 5 262 EUR) and the average delay is 126 days (standard deviation = 195 
days). Table 6 presents the regression results with either fixed (Column 2) or random 
individual effects (Column 3). The Hausman test indicates that the fixed effect model should 
be used. The assumption underlying the use of the fixed-effect model in our study is as 
follows: if the determinants of the disposition effect are correlated with some unobserved 
investors’ characteristics, they are only correlated with the time-invariant component of these 
characteristics. However, as the fixed effect model does not provide consistent estimators for 
the coefficients of the time-invariant regressors (Age, Gender, Foreign Trade, Bonds, 





Results show that in all estimations, our variables have a significant impact on the yearly 
DE . Coefficients are significant at the highest level and we obtain signs in accordance with 
those of the cross-sectional regressions; the coefficients of demographic variables and of 
financial sophistication proxies are negative. On the opposite, trading behavior variables 
impact positively the disposition effect. These results demonstrate that the variables we found 
                                                            
11 The Hausman-Taylor estimator is an instrumental-variables estimator that additionally enables these 
coefficients to be estimated by making the stronger assumption that some specified regressors are uncorrelated 
with the fixed effect. 16 
 
pertinent to explain the differences in the DE  at the static level (section III) still play the 
same role when the yearly DE  is analyzed. 
IV.2. Dynamic Analyses of the Disposition Effect 
In this last section, we question the ability of investors to reduce their disposition bias over 
time and the role played by financial sophistication. Then, we investigate the dynamics of 
DE  over time, checking whether investors’ DE  for any period t may be explained by the 
DE  of the preceding period (t-1). Formally, we consider that investor’s i  DE  in period t can 
be modeled by the following dynamic equation with unobserved fixed individual effect
12: 
11 2 ln ln (4)
1,...,20379 1999,...,2006
it it it it i it DE DE Trade Size Delay f
it
αβ β ε − =+ + + +
==
 
Note that the DEs in equation (4) are yearly DEs and that Trade Size and Delay are also 
computed on a yearly basis.  Actually, if investors have the ability to correct their disposition 
bias over time, we expect to observe  1 α < .  Given the dynamic nature of our model, we 
cannot refer to an OLS method for estimation
13. We thus refer to Arellano and Bond (1991) 
who propose an estimation of the dynamic model with an extension of the Generalized 
Method of Moments
14 (Hansen, 1982). In the Arellano-Bond methodology, equation (4) is 
estimated in first differences, by using the lagged independent variables as instruments. This 
differentiation process removes the unobserved fixed effects. Under some assumptions
15, the 
differenced residuals satisfy orthogonality conditions and it can be shown that all lagged 
                                                            
12 The variable fi accounts for others unobserved investors’ characteristics that do not vary with time. 
13 In fact, the presence of a lagged variable with fixed effects produces biased and non consistent OLS estimates 
This arises because the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term although there is no 
autocorrelation between terms εit. 
14 Arellano-Bond methodology is available in Stata. The poor performance of GMM for panel data is only 
documented for small samples (see Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
15 The later step in the estimation is to verify this assumption by checking if the average covariance in residuals 
of order 1 and 2 are zero. 17 
 
variables  it k DE − for  2 k ≥ are valid instruments
16. Estimation results are reported in Table 7 
for 114 747 yearly DEs over our 20 379 investors.  
 [Table 7 about here] 
  Results show that coefficients estimates are significant at the highest level. Most 
importantly, we observe  1 α < , which, in line with previous research (Feng and Seasholes, 
2005), indicates that the disposition effect is a bias investors may learn to attenuate over 
time
17.  
This first result brings us to investigate a last issue: does financial sophistication play 
any role in the correction of the disposition bias over time? In other words, is the decrease of 
the bias even stronger for investors we consider to be financially sophisticated? To answer 
this question, we estimate equation (4) separately for financially sophisticated and 
unsophisticated traders. We keep in mind that financial sophistication in this paper hints 
originally to trading foreign assets, bonds and warrants and to the use of two accounts 
(traditional accounts and tax-free PEA accounts) to place orders.  Table 8 reports the results 
with respect to our 4 financial sophistication proxies. Results should be read as follows; for 
instance, concerning Foreign Trade, Column 2 of Table 8 (Foreign Trade=0) presents 
estimated coefficients for unsophisticated traders while Column 3 of the same table (Foreign 
Trade=1) reports estimations for sophisticated investors.  
[Table 8 about here] 
                                                            
16DEt-2 values for t=2001 to 2006 and independent variables are used as instruments.  
17 Furthermore, the null hypothesis that the error terms are serially uncorrelated is, as expected, rejected at order 
1 but not at order 2 at a level of 5%. Note that due to the fact that 9 instruments are used to estimate 5 
parameters, we also perform a Sargan test of overidentifying restriction; unfortunately, the null hypothesis that 
the population moment conditions are correct is rejected at a level of 5%.  
 18 
 
We notice that the coefficient estimates are in all cases significant at the highest level. 
Furthermore, whichever sophistication proxy we consider, we observe a lower α  for 
sophisticated investors. For instance, as far as Foreign Trade is concerned,  α  equals 0.174 
for sophisticated traders and 0.197 for unsophisticated investors. Then our financial 




This paper studies the disposition effect at an individual level on the basis of trading 
records of 20 379 investors at a large discount brokerage house.  We show that although we 
observe an average positive disposition effect, there is a huge disparity among investors. For 
instance, about 14% of our sample investors exhibit an opposite behavior. We propose to 
explain the cross-section of the bias using direct and original sophistication variables as well 
as trading behavior proxies. We define sophistication with regards to four dimensions: 
investors are sophisticated if they trade foreign assets, warrants and bonds and if they hold 
two types of accounts to place orders (tax-free account and traditional account). Results show 
that financially sophisticated investors are less prone to the disposition effect. In the same 
vein, trading behavior variables contribute to explain individual differences in the bias; 
investors trading more frequently are less subject to the disposition effect.  Furthermore, a 
formal test conducted in a dynamic panel study shows that individual investors’ disposition 
effect decreases over time. The impact of our direct sophistication proxies on this reduction 
gives us optimistic views about investors’ ability to correct their behavioral mistakes over 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics on our entire dataset and on our sample 
The second column of this table presents statistics on the whole dataset, i.e.  57 153 investors over the period 
1999-2006. The third column presents statistics on the same period on the 20 379 investors studied in this paper. 
Panel 2 gives information about trading behavior; “Average number of trades” refers to the number of trades by 
investors computed over 1999-2006. “Average number of years of activity” is the number of years investors own 
active accounts: active accounts are those with at least one transaction over 1 year.  “Average total trade amount” 
is the total amount (EUR) traded by investors over 1999-2006. Age (in years) is computed at the beginning of 
1999. Medians are reported in parentheses. 
  Entire data set  Data in this paper 
Panel 1 : Sample size 
Number of investors  57 153  20 379 
Panel 2 : Trading behavior 
Average number of trades   144 (52)  284 (137) 
Average number of years of activity   4.98 (5)  6.82 (7) 
Average total trade amount  558 429 (109 157)  1 037 869 (299 328) 
- Buy  282 117 (56 559)  524 301 (153 765) 
- Sell  276 312 ( 52 237)  513 568 (145 041) 
Panel 3 : Investor demographics 
% of men  80.27 82.45 
Average age in 1999  41.34 (39)  43.66 (42) 
 
Table 2 Individual disposition effect 
The Proportion of Gains Realized (PGR), the Proportion of Losses Realized (PLR) and the Disposition Effect 
(DE) are measured for each of our 20 379 sample investors over the period 1999-2006. This table reports 
descriptive statistics of the different estimates. ***  means significant at the 1% level. 
  Mean Std.  Deviation 
PGR   0.197 0.116 
PLR   0.098 0.075 
/ PGR PLR   2.012 4.630 
DE   0.099 0.115 




Table 3: Independent variables 
This table contains the description of variables (column 2) and descriptive statistics on individual characteristics 
and trading patterns of the 20 379 investors in the sample (columns 3 and 4). Individual characteristics are 
mainly dummy variables for which frequencies are reported: Gender, Foreign trade, Bonds, Warrants, Two 
Accounts. Quantitative variables give information on trading pattern (with the exception of investors’ Age) for 
which mean and standard deviation are reported. 
 




Panel 1 :Demographics 
 
Age 
Computed in years on the 
01/01/1999 
43.66 13.48 





Panel 2 :Financial sophistication 
Foreign Trade  = 1 if the investor trades 
foreign assets during the 1999-
2006 period, 0 elsewhere. 
Foreign assets’ ISIN do not 
begin with “FR” 
 
86.04%  
Bonds  = 1 if the investor trades bonds 




Warrants  = 1 if the investor trades 
warrants during the 1999-2006 
period, 0 elsewhere 
 
24.68%  
Two Accounts  = 1 if the investor trades on a 
tax-free “PEA account” and a 
traditional account, 0 if the 
investor trades only on a 
traditional account 
61.08%  
Panel 3 : Trading behavior 
Trade Size  Computed as the total amount 
traded (EUR) divided by the 




Delay  Average number of days 




This table contains results at the individual level for PGR, PLR and DE based on the transactions of 20 379 
investors over 1999-2006. Results are reported for the different values of dummy variables pertaining to 
financial sophistication: Foreign Trade (=1 if the investor trades foreign assets), Bonds (=1 if the investor trades 
bonds), Warrants (=1 if the investor trades warrants), Two accounts (=1 if the investor trades on both a PEA 
account and a traditional account). We also include results relating to gender. Standard Deviations are given in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that the results are significant respectively at the 1% level, at the 5% level 
and at the 10% level. 
 
 PGR  PLR  DE  Z-stat 
Panel 1 :Gender 














Panel 2 : Sophisticated investors (sophistication = 1) 




























Panel 3 :Unsophisticated investors (sophistication = 0) 


































This table contains results for the linear regression of the disposition effect for the transactions of 20 379 
investors over 1999-2006. Model 1 gives the estimate of the coefficients of equation (2). Model 2 to 5 gives 
separately the results of equation (2) for each sophistication variable. Student t appears in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * indicate that the results are significant respectively at the 1% level, at the 5% level and at the 10% level. 














































   
Bonds  -0.013*** 













Two  Accounts 
 
-0.009*** 






























2  0.105 0.101 0.101 0.100 0.102 
 




Table 6: Regression results 
This table contains results for the panel data regression of 114 747 yearly individual disposition effects. Column 
2 gives the estimate of the coefficients of equation (3) for fixed effects. Column 3 gives the estimate of the 
coefficients of equation (3) for random effects. Robust standard errors of all coefficients are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that the results are significant respectively at the 1% level, at the 5% level 
and at the 10% level. 
 
Variables  Fixed effects  Random effects  Hausman-Taylor 
estimator 











































2 within  0.016 0.013  
R
2 between  0.019 0.069  
R
2 overall  0.0174 0.034   
Hausman   546.00***   
Wald    3106.29*** 
N  114 747  114 747  114 747 
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Table 7: Dynamic panel data estimations 
This table contains results for the dynamic panel data regression. It gives the estimate of the coefficients of 
equation (4) for the whole sample – 20 379 investors and 114 747 DEs. Robust standard errors of the coefficient 
for the preceding disposition effect are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that the results are 
significant respectively at the 1% level, at the 5% level and at the 10% level. 
  Dynamic panel data 
(114 747 investor-years) 
Obs. Nber  60376 
Grps. Nber  18895 
DEt-1 .177*** 
(.0053) 











Table 8: Dynamic panel estimations and sophistication 
This table contains results for the dynamic panel data regression for the 20 379 investors, which sums up to 114 
747 yearly DEs. Column 2 to 9 gives separately the results of equation (4) for each sophistication variable. 
Robust standard errors of the coefficient for the preceding disposition effect are reported in parentheses. . ***, 
** and * indicate that the results are significant respectively at the 1% level, at the 5% level and at the 10% level. 





Obs. nber  6463  53913  43355  17021 


































Wald 300.43  1622.46  1505.81  424.63 
Nber of instr.  9  9  9  9 
 
  Bonds=0 Bonds=1  Two  Accounts=0 Two  Accounts=1 
Obs. nber  51405  8971  21319  39057 

































Wald 1643.37  291.50  605.36  1368.46 














Figure 1 Distribution of disposition effect of the 20 379 investors 
This figure gives the distribution of the disposition effect across individual investors. The number of investors is 
given in thousands. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the 114747 yearly disposition effect. 
This figure gives the distribution of the yearly disposition effects across the 20 379 investors. The number of 
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